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Department of Homeland Security 
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____________________________________ 
 
Submitted pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
 on March 3, 2016 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH and  
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges 
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(Opinion filed:  June 23, 2016) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge 
 Petitioner Jose Luis Bedolla Avila (“Bedolla”), a 
native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of a Final 
Administrative Removal Order (“FARO”) issued on March 9, 
2015, by an Assistant Field Office Director with U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), United 
States Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), in 
Allenwood, Pennsylvania.  For the reasons that follow, we 
will deny the petition for review. 
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I. 
 Bedolla illegally entered the United States in 1991, 
although he traveled to Mexico and re-entered the United 
States at least once since then.  In February 2012, he was 
arrested in Chester County, Pennsylvania, on a bench warrant 
for failure to appear at trial on a charge of driving under the 
influence of alcohol.  He was referred to an Immigration 
Enforcement Agent and, on February 22, 2012, was placed in 
removal proceedings pursuant to Section 240 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1229a, 
on the grounds that he is an alien present in the United States 
without being admitted or paroled under INA 
§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (“An alien 
present in the United States without being admitted or 
paroled, or who arrives in the United States at any time or 
place other than as designated by the Attorney General, is 
inadmissible.”).  An Immigration Enforcement Agent 
personally served him with a Notice to Appear on February 
29, 2012.   
 Bedolla obtained counsel.  He conceded removability 
and requested cancellation of removal and adjustment of 
status.  In February 2014, DHS filed a motion to pretermit the 
application for adjustment of status on the grounds that 
Bedolla had departed the United States and reentered without 
inspection after accruing more than one year of unlawful 
presence in the United States.  See INA § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I), 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I).  Bedolla did not respond to the 
motion.  The Immigration Judge pretermitted the application 
for adjustment of status on April 18, 2014 and set a hearing 
on the issue of cancellation of removal for August 26, 2014. 
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 On May 1, 2014, before the scheduled hearing date, 
Bedolla was arrested on drug charges.  His attorney obtained 
a continuance of his removal hearing due to his arrest and 
incarceration.  On February 18, 2015, Bedolla pleaded guilty 
to a charge of Possession with Intent to Manufacture or 
Deliver Cocaine in violation of 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).  
The same day, the Court of Common Pleas of Chester 
County, Pennsylvania, sentenced Bedolla to a term of 
imprisonment of 282 days to 23 months pursuant to the plea 
agreement. 
 The day after Bedolla entered the guilty plea, February 
19, 2015, DHS issued a Notice of Intent to Issue a Final 
Administrative Removal Order (“NOI”), placing Bedolla in 
expedited administrative removal proceedings pursuant to 
INA § 238(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b), and charging him as 
removable under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), due to his conviction of an aggravated 
felony as defined in INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(B).  The NOI advised that Bedolla must 
respond to the charges in writing within 10 calendar days of 
service (or 13 days if service was by mail), and that the 
response may, among other things, rebut the charges or 
request withholding of removal.  The unsigned Certificate of 
Service accompanying the NOI does not indicate the date or 
manner of attempted service.  A check-box indicates, 
however, that Bedolla refused to acknowledge receipt of the 
NOI. 
 On March 9, 2015, an ICE detention officer wrote a 
memorandum to the Assistant Field Office Director advising 
that the period for responding to the NOI had elapsed, 
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Bedolla had not filed a response, and a FARO should be 
signed.  That same day, the Assistant Field Office Director 
signed the FARO.  Although the Certificate of Service 
accompanying the FARO does not accurately reflect the date 
or manner of service, Bedolla avers that he received the 
FARO shortly after March 9, 2015.1  Bedolla timely filed this 
petition for review on April 8, 2015, within thirty days of the 
date of the FARO.   
 Meanwhile, on March 17, 2015, at DHS’s request, the 
Immigration Judge terminated the still-pending INA § 240 
removal proceeding that had been initiated in February 2012.  
DHS then re-issued the FARO on April 20, 2015, and served 
                                              
1 The Certificate of Service at the bottom of the FARO 
appears to have been signed by the same Immigration 
Enforcement Agent who signed the NOI and bears the same 
date as the NOI, February 20, 2015, while the Order portion 
of the FARO was signed by the Assistant Field Office 
Director on March 9, 2015.  It is not clear whether DHS 
attempted to serve Bedolla with an unsigned copy of the 
FARO on February 20, 2015 (service that Bedolla rejected) or 
whether there is an error on the certificate of service on the 
March 9, 2015, FARO.  Although this might give rise to 
confusion, Bedolla has not argued that a FARO was issued on 
February 20, 2015, and he did not timely file a petition for 
review of any document issued on that date.  Accordingly, 
this opinion considers the FARO that undisputedly was 
signed by the Assistant Field Office Director on March 9, 
2015, was served upon Bedolla shortly thereafter, and from 
which Bedolla filed this petition for review. 
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it the following week upon Bedolla in person in York, 
Pennsylvania on April 27, 2015.  Bedolla did not petition for 
review of the April 20, 2015, FARO.2   
 Bedolla expressed a fear of returning to Mexico.  An 
Asylum Officer therefore conducted a reasonable fear 
interview on May 19, 2015, and, on June 3, 2015, denied 
Bedolla’s reasonable fear claim.  Bedolla requested a hearing 
before an Immigration Judge, which was held on June 8, 
2015.  The Immigration Judge found that Bedolla did not 
establish a reasonable possibility that he would be persecuted 
or tortured in Mexico, and therefore returned the case to DHS 
for Bedolla’s removal.  Bedolla later moved to re-open the 
proceeding and submit further evidence.  The Immigration 
Judge denied reopening and Bedolla did not seek review of 
that decision.      
                                              
2 The same Assistant Field Office Director signed both 
versions of the FARO and prepared the Certified Official 
Record of Proceedings on behalf of DHS.  The Certified 
Official Record of Proceedings does not include the copy of 
the March 9, 2015, FARO that we now review.  This Court 
therefore has relied upon the copies of the March 9, 2015, 
FARO provided by Bedolla and which appears in the 
appendix to the Government’s brief.  The inaccuracies in the 
March 9, 2015, FARO and its omission from the official 
Certified Official Record of Proceedings are troubling.  This 
Court requires an accurate administrative record in order to 
properly consider a petition for review.  Agencies must be 
scrupulous in including all documents before certifying the 
record. 
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 We have jurisdiction over questions of law and 
constitutional claims presented in this petition for review.  
See INA § 242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  On June 
11, 2015, Bedolla moved to have this Court stay removal.  
The Government did not oppose that motion.  On August 26, 
2015, a panel of this Court granted a stay of removal pending 
further order of the Court. 
II. 
Bedolla argues that DHS erred by placing him in 
expedited administrative removal proceedings because his 
crime is not an aggravated felony for purposes of removal 
under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
(“Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any 
time after admission is deportable.”).  Whether a criminal 
conviction constitutes an aggravated felony for purposes of 
removal is a question of law subject to plenary review.  
Thomas v. Attorney General, 625 F.3d 134, 141 (3d Cir. 
2010).   
 INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B), 
defines the term “aggravated felony” as, inter alia, “illicit 
trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 
of Title 21), including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in 
section 924(c) of Title 18).”  To determine whether Bedolla’s 
crime qualifies as an aggravated felony, we first attempt to 
employ the formal categorical approach.  See Singh v. 
Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 147 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Taylor v. 
United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990)).  This involves 
review of the statute of conviction without consulting other 
factual evidence.  There are, however, situations in which a 
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statute of conviction is divisible, i.e., it “sets out one or more 
elements of the offense in the alternative.”  Descamps v. 
United States, 33 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013).  Where the statute 
of conviction is divisible, a departure from the formal 
categorical approach is necessary and a modified categorical 
approach instead must be employed.  See Evanson v. Attorney 
General, 550 F.3d 284, 291 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 The statute under which Bedolla was convicted, 35 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30), is divisible with regard to both 
the conduct and the controlled substances to which it applies.  
United States v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(“Because [the statute] can be violated by the possession of 
and intent to distribute many different drugs, the types of 
which can increase the prescribed range of penalties, the 
statute includes several alternative elements and is therefore 
divisible.”); Catwell v. Attorney General, 623 F.3d 199, 207 
(3d Cir. 2010) (concluding the statute is divisible with regard 
to conduct because it describes distinct offenses of 
manufacture, delivery, and possession with intent to deliver 
or manufacture); see also Garcia v. Attorney General, 462 
F.3d 287, 293 n.9 (3d Cir. 2006).  Accordingly, we may 
“consult a limited class of documents . . . to determine which 
alternative [elements] formed the basis of the . . . conviction.”  
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281.   
 We therefore will consider the charging document, 
plea agreement, and trial court judgment to determine the 
exact crime to which Bedolla pleaded guilty.  See Shepard v. 
United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005); Abbott, 748 F.3d at 
158.  It is undisputed that, in Bedolla’s case, the controlled 
substance in question was cocaine.  Bedolla argues, however, 
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that his conviction was for conduct that does not qualify as an 
aggravated felony because he pleaded guilty to the mere 
possession of cocaine only.  This argument is unavailing.  
 The statute of conviction, 35 Pa. Cons. St. § 780-
113(a)(30), encompasses the following conduct:  
“manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to 
manufacture or deliver” a controlled substance.  With regard 
to possession, an intent to manufacture or deliver is an 
element of the offense.  Cf. Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 
299 (3d Cir. 2002).  The relevant documents unequivocally 
establish that Bedolla pleaded guilty to possession with intent 
to deliver cocaine.  For instance, the first charge of the 
criminal complaint accuses Bedolla of “Possession With 
Intent to Deliver COCAINE” in violation of 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. 
§ 780-113(a)(30).  The plea colloquy similarly describes the 
crime to which Bedolla pleaded guilty as “Possession w/ 
intent to deliver cocaine,” a felony with a maximum ten-year 
sentence.  In support of the plea, Bedolla admitted, “From 
2/14 to 4/14 defendant did give [illegible] cocaine to another 
when not licensed to do so.  Happened in Chester County 
PA,” and his colloquy acknowledged both that his lawyer 
explained the elements of the offense to him and that he 
admitted that he committed the crime to which he pleaded 
guilty.  Finally, the Court of Common Pleas sentencing sheet 
indicates that the charge was “PWID,” which is obviously an 
acronym for “possession with intent to deliver,” and is again 
listed as “Possession with Intent to deliver-cocaine, 2 grams,” 
which is a grade “F” crime (a felony).   
 Having identified Bedolla’s crime as the felony of 
possession with intent to deliver cocaine, we next employ the 
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framework for determining whether his conviction constitutes 
an aggravated felony.  In Gerbier, 280 F.3d at 313, we held 
there are two independent but valid routes by which an 
offense may be found to qualify as an aggravated felony.  The 
first, the illicit trafficking route, provides that a crime is an 
aggravated felony if it is a felony under state law and contains 
a trafficking element.  Id.  The second, the hypothetical 
federal felony route, provides that a crime is an aggravated 
felony if it would qualify as a felony under the Federal 
Controlled Substances Act.  Id.  
   Bedolla argues that his conviction does not qualify as 
an aggravated felony because his crime does not contain a 
trafficking element.  See id. at 299 (a state felony drug 
conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony if it contains a 
trafficking element).  According to Bedolla, he did not 
commit a trafficking offense because he did not admit to the 
exchange of drugs for money.  Yet we need not decide 
whether Bedolla’s conviction is a trafficking offense because 
the hypothetical felony route leads us clearly to the 
conclusion that Bedolla’s crime is an aggravated felony. 
 “Under the hypothetical federal felony route, we 
compare the offense of conviction to the federal Controlled 
Substances Act to determine if it is analogous to an offense 
under that Act.”  Evanson, 550 F.3d at 289.  A Pennsylvania 
felony conviction of possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to deliver is analogous to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) of the 
Controlled Substances Act.  See Catwell, 623 F.3d at 207-08; 
Jeune v. Attorney General, 476 F.3d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 2007).  
The Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 
provides that it is a crime to “manufacture, distribute, or 
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dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or 
dispense, a controlled substance.”  Where the controlled 
substance in question is cocaine, the crime is punishable by a 
term of imprisonment of “not more than twenty years,” which 
qualifies as a felony.3  21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (“[I]n the 
case of a controlled substance in schedule I or II . . . such 
person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not 
more than 20 years. . . .”); see also 21 U.S.C. § 812 Schedule 
II (listing cocaine); 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(3) (providing that an 
offense for which the maximum term of imprisonment is less 
than twenty-five years but ten or more years is a Class C 
felony).   
 Because Bedolla was convicted of a crime analogous 
to the federal felony of possession with intent to distribute 
cocaine prohibited by § 841(a)(1) of the Controlled 
Substances Act, he committed an aggravated felony.  Thus, 
                                              
3 Although Bedolla’s crime involved a relatively small 
quantity of cocaine (2 grams), the federal Controlled 
Substances Act does not contain an exception for a conviction 
involving a small quantity of cocaine.  In contrast, state 
convictions for possession with intent to deliver small 
amounts of marijuana for no remuneration may be subject to 
an express exception to the Controlled Substances Act.  See  
21 U.S.C. 841(b)(4); Catwell, 623 F.3d at 206-07 (a state 
conviction for distributing a small amount of marijuana 
without remuneration may not be analogous to a felony 
conviction under the Controlled Substances Act and therefore 
may not qualify as an aggravated felony under the 
hypothetical federal felony route). 
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Bedolla was properly subject to expedited administrative 
removal under INA § 238(b), 28 U.S.C. § 1228(b). 
III. 
 Next, Bedolla argues that the FARO is invalid 
because, at the time it was issued, the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review (“EOIR”) and DHS simultaneously were 
conducting removal proceedings against him on two separate 
bases – as an alien present without being admitted (in an 
EOIR removal proceeding before an Immigration Judge under 
INA § 240) and as an aggravated felon (in an expedited 
administrative removal proceeding initiated by DHS under 
INA § 238).  According to Bedolla, DHS and EOIR lack 
jurisdiction to concurrently adjudicate removal proceedings 
on separate bases involving the same individual.  The 
government responds that no statute or regulation prohibits a 
period of brief concurrent proceedings before both DHS and 
the Immigration Judge, particularly where the two removal 
proceedings were commenced on independent grounds. 
 Whether the applicable regulations preclude 
concurrent removal proceedings presents a question of 
statutory interpretation subject to our de novo review.  
Cheruku v. Attorney General, 662 F.3d 198, 202 (3d Cir. 
2011).  In support of his claim, Bedolla relies primarily upon 
8 C.F.R. § 238.1(e), which provides:  
In any proceeding commenced under section 
240 of the Act which is based on 
deportability under section 237 of the Act, if 
it appears that the respondent alien is subject 
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to removal pursuant to section 238 of the 
Act, the immigration judge may, upon the 
Service’s request, terminate the case and, 
upon such termination, the Service may 
commence administrative proceedings under 
section 238 of the Act. However, in the 
absence of any such request, the immigration 
judge shall complete the proceeding 
commenced under section 240 of the Act. 
8 CFR § 238.1(e) (emphasis added).  According to Bedolla, 
this regulation mandates that any proceeding before the 
Immigration Judge must be dismissed before DHS 
permissibly may initiate an expedited removal proceeding.   
 We need not decide whether Bedolla has properly 
interpreted this regulation.  Bedolla overlooks a critical issue: 
the terms of 8 CFR § 238.1 do not apply to him.  The 
regulation applies only to § 240 proceedings before an 
Immigration Judge that are “based on deportability under 
section 237 of the Act.” (emphasis added).  Bedolla’s original 
removal proceeding was not based on INA § 237, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227, which applies to “deportable aliens.”  Rather, 
Bedolla’s removal proceeding before the Immigration Judge 
was based on INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), which applies to “inadmissible aliens,” 
due to his status as an alien who had not been admitted or 
paroled.  He was not the subject of a Section 237 proceeding; 
therefore, by its terms, 8 C.F.R. § 238.1 does not control.   
 Bedolla next looks to the regulations at 8 C.F.R. 
§§ 239.1 and 239.2, which govern the issuance and 
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cancellation of a notice to appear, the document that triggers 
proceedings before an Immigration Judge.  For instance, 8 
C.F.R. § 239.2(c) provides that “[a]fter commencement of 
proceedings pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14 [concerning 
commencement of proceedings before an Immigration Judge], 
ICE counsel, or any officer enumerated in paragraph (a) of 
this section, may move for dismissal of the matter on the 
grounds set out under paragraph (a) of this section.”  
Paragraph (a), in turn, permits cancellation of a notice to 
appear on a number of grounds, including that 
“[c]ircumstances of the case have changed after the notice to 
appear was issued to such an extent that continuation is no 
longer in the best interest of the government.”  8 C.F.R. 
§ 239.2(a)(7).   
 We see nothing in these provisions directing that a 
proceeding before an Immigration Judge must be cancelled at 
a particular time.  We certainly see nothing to support 
Bedolla’s claim that the regulations “do not permit” a brief 
period in which an individual may face removal proceedings 
before both an Immigration Judge and DHS.  These 
regulations simply do not address the issue of concurrently 
pending removal proceedings where, as here, the proceedings 
were based upon independent reasons for effecting removal. 
 In support of his interpretation of 8 C.F.R. § 239.2, 
Bedolla relies upon a decision by the Board of Immigration 
Appeals, In re G-N-C, 22 I & N Dec. 281 (BIA 1998).  In G-
N-C, the government moved to terminate a proceeding 
pending before an Immigration Judge so that it could reinstate 
a prior deportation order under INA § 241, based upon the 
petitioner’s conviction of a crime of moral turpitude.  Id. at 
15 
 
282-83.  The day after the government filed the motion, 
without considering any response from the petitioner, the 
Immigration Judge summarily terminated the removal 
proceeding as unopposed.  Id.  
 Upon review, the BIA determined that the Immigration 
Judge erred by terminating the proceeding at the 
government’s request and without notice to the other side.  
The BIA concluded that, once proceedings have begun before 
an Immigration Judge, the government may move for 
dismissal only in the manner provided by 8 C.F.R. § 239.2: 
[A]fter commencement of proceedings in the 
Immigration Court, Service counsel “may move 
for dismissal of the matter on the grounds set 
out (in) this section.” 8 C.F.R. § 239.2(c). This 
language marks a clear boundary between the 
time prior to commencement of proceedings, 
where a Service officer has decisive power to 
cancel proceedings, and the time following 
commencement, where the Service officer 
merely has the privilege to move for dismissal 
of proceedings. By this distinction, the 
regulation presumably contemplates not just the 
automatic grant of a motion to terminate, but an 
informed adjudication by the Immigration 
Judge or this Board based on an evaluation of 
the factors underlying the Service’s motion. 
 Thus, the G-N-C decision addresses the proper manner 
in which an Immigration Judge may terminate one removal 
proceeding where a second is going forward.  22 I & N Dec. 
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at 284.  It does not undermine our conclusion that 8 C.F.R. 
§ 239.2 is silent as to whether concurrent removal 
proceedings may be permitted to proceed.  Indeed, G-N-C 
recognizes that an Immigration Judge has the authority to 
deny a motion to terminate, which implies that two 
proceedings could be allowed to go forward simultaneously.  
See 22 I & N Dec. at 284 (“[T]he regulation presumably 
contemplates not just the automatic grant of a motion to 
terminate, but an informed adjudication by the Immigration 
Judge or this Board based on an evaluation of the factors 
underlying the Service’s motion.”).   
 Finally, Bedolla looks to INA § 238(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1228(b)(1), which provides, “[t]he Attorney General may, 
in the case of an alien described in paragraph (2), determine 
the deportability of such alien under section 
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) of this title (relating to conviction of an 
aggravated felony) and issue an order of removal pursuant to 
the procedures set forth in this subsection or section 1229a of 
this title.” (emphasis added).  According to Bedolla, the “or” 
at the end of this provision reflects a congressional intent to 
prohibit concurrent proceedings under both sets of 
procedures. 
 Once again, we do not interpret this language to 
prohibit the pendency of concurrent removal proceedings.  
Rather, this statute permits the government discretion to issue 
a final order of removal under either one of the two applicable 
provisions.  In Bedolla’s case, DHS chose to proceed by 
issuing a final order of removal under INA § 238(b), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1228(b), rather than under INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.  
This is consistent with the terms of the statute, and does not 
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compel a conclusion that the FARO is invalid solely because 
it was issued while a proceeding before an Immigration Judge 
remained pending. 
IV. 
 Finally, Bedolla argues that the conduct of 
simultaneous proceedings before the Immigration Judge and 
DHS resulted in a deprivation of his right to due process.  We 
reject this claim.  Bedolla has made no showing that he was 
prevented from reasonably presenting his case.  See Uspango 
v. Ashcroft, 289 F.3d 226, 231 (3d Cir. 2002).  Moreover, as 
we have concluded that there was no violation of the 
applicable statutes or regulations, Bedolla has failed to 
establish that he suffered a violation of any fundamental right.  
Cf. Leslie v. Attorney General, 611 F.3d 171, 178 (3d Cir. 
2010) (“[V]iolations of regulations promulgated to protect 
fundamental statutory or constitutional rights need not be 
accompanied by a showing of prejudice to warrant judicial 
relief.”).     
V. 
 For all of the foregoing reasons, the petition for review 
will be denied.  The stay of removal previously imposed by a 
panel of this Court is hereby lifted.    
 
 
